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Higgs v. State, 126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 1 (January 14, 2010)1
CRIMINAL LAW
Summary
A multi-faceted appeal from a Second Judicial District Court conviction of first-degree
murder.
Disposition/Outcome
District Court’s conviction upheld.
Factual and Procedural History
On July 7, 2006, nurse Chaz Higgs (“Higgs”) noted to a coworker, Kim Ramey
(“Ramey”), that the appropriate way to “get rid of someone” was to use succinylcholine.
Succinylcholine is an anti-paralytic drug used largely in emergency medical situations.
Suspiciously, the next day Higgs called emergency personnel after finding his wife, Kathy
Augustine (“Augustine”) unresponsive in their home. After learning of Augustine’s ailment,
Ramey reported to police and treating physicians that she conversed the day before with Higgs
and suspected that succinylcholine contributed to Augustine’s condition. Augustine’s treating
physician took a urine sample to test for succinylcholine. Three days later, Augustine died after
removal from life support. In determining Augustine’s cause of death, investigators sent the
urine sample to the FBI. Toxicologist Madeline Montgomery (“Montgomery”) of the FBI issued
a report showing the presence of succinylcholine in Augustine.
Police arrested Higgs in September 2006 and he was formally charged with first-degree
murder of Augustine in December 2006. Both sides stipulated to a trial date of July 2007.
During trial preparation, expert examination of the urine sample was important to both the State
and the defendant. Both parties agreed that Montgomery worked cooperatively with defense
expert Chip Walls (“Walls”). In May 2007, defense counsel moved for a continuance to allow
Walls more time to evaluate the FBI’s test results. The lower court denied the motion, reasoning
that the defense waited too long to request more time and Walls possessed sufficient knowledge
about the FBI toxicology report and methodology.
Higgs’ trial began June 18, 2007. The State presented witnesses that described the
troubled marital relationship between Higgs and Augustine and Higgs’ unemotional response to
Augustine’s death. Similarly, Ramey testified about the conservation she had with the
defendant, where he noted the appropriate way to “get rid of someone.” The State also presented
testimony of medical personnel who explained that a nurse, like Higgs, would be familiar with
the use of succinylcholine and would be able to obtain it without difficulty. Police officers
testified that Higgs possessed materials discussing the administration of succinylcholine.
Expert scientific evidence was critical throughout the trial. Augustine’s attending
physicians ruled out mundane causes of death, such as heart attack or stroke, and explained that
succinylcholine poisoning could have been the cause of death. The physicians also emphasized
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that the hospital never administered the drug during the course of Augustine’s treatment. A
toxicologist explained that a tissue sample from Augustine contained a puncture wound, but it
was unclear whether succinylcholine was injected into the tissue. A pathologist for the defense
testified that the puncture wound in the tissue sample was too fresh to have occurred prior to
Augustine’s arrival at the hospital. Most importantly, Montgomery explained the volatile
chemical nature and effects of succinylcholine and the ways experts test samples for the drug.
Montgomery also testified that succinylcholine was present in Augustine’s urine prior to her
death. Although defense expert Walls did not testify during the trial, defense counsel used
information obtained during his investigation during cross-examination of Montgomery.
Ultimately, a jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder. He appealed on
numerous grounds. The Court initially decided the appeal in an unpublished opinion issued May
2009. After the Nevada Justice Association moved for publication, the Court published the
decision in January 2010.
Discussion
Motion to continue the trial
Writing for a majority of four, Justice Hardesty began by noting that the Nevada Supreme
Court reviews motions for continuance for an abuse of discretion.2 Abuse of discretion usually
occurs where a litigant has inadequate time to prepare for trial and is prejudiced by denial of a
continuance.3 The Court noted the defendant did not demonstrate prejudice and went on to
observe that the State and its expert witness worked cooperatively in providing information to
the defendant. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the defendant had approximately six months
to evaluate the FBI’s toxicology report and had numerous opportunities to request additional
time prior to May 2007. Finally, the Court concluded that the lower Court did not abuse its
discretion by denying Defendant’s motion to continue.
Sufficiency of the evidence
When evaluating evidence sufficiency, the Nevada Supreme Court views evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution and considers whether any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential criminal elements beyond a reasonable doubt.4 Because the State
produced evidence that linked the defendant to succinylcholine, cleared the hospital of
administering the drug, provided a motive, and demonstrated Augustine’s cause of death, the
Court held there was enough to support the major elements of first-degree murder.
Expert testimony
In order to clarify prior confusion in Nevada law, Justice Hardesty discussed at length the
judiciary’s role as gatekeepers for expert testimony.
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Rose v. State, 123 Nev. 194, 206, 163 P3d 408, 416 (2007).
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The Court began with an assessment of the United States Supreme Court decision in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.5 In Daubert, the United States Supreme Court
liberalized admission of expert witness testimony to be more compatible with Federal Rule of
Evidence 702.6 The Supreme Court noted the importance of relevance and reliability in expert
testimony7 and gave a sizeable, though non-exhaustive, list of factors a court may wish to
evaluate.8 Writing in dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the majority’s list of factors
undermines discretion in assessing cases on their individual fact patterns and potentially causes
confusion.
Although later United States Supreme Court opinions attempted to clarify that Daubert
factors are not exhaustive and meant to be flexible, Chief Justice Hardesty noted a survey of
Circuit Court opinions which demonstrated that the factors have been inconsistently used and
often understood as a mandate.
Applying Daubert to Nevada law, the Court noted that state precedent mirrors Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s concerns about rigid application of the enumerated Daubert factors.
Particularly in the case of Hallmark v. Eldridge, the Nevada Supreme Court noted that Daubert
is only persuasive when understood to endorse a flexible approach to judicial gate keeping and
has never been fully adopted.9 Although the Court largely agreed with the importance of
relevance and reliability, the majority noted that Nevada law, as codified in NRS 50.275 suggests
three elements for admission of expert witness testimony. These factors are intended to create an
inquiry based in law, rather than scientific principles. First, the expert must be qualified.
Second, testimony must assist the jury. Third, the expert may not testify beyond the scope of
their expertise. The Court then strongly emphasized that factors are not meant to be exhaustive
and judicial discretion is supported.
Lastly, the Court considered whether the lower court abused its discretion by admitting
Montgomery’s testimony. Because Montgomery possessed scientific credentials and training,
she was a qualified expert. Testimony about succinylcholine’s chemical property and presence
in Augustine’s urine was useful to cause of death and assisted the jury. Lastly, Montgomery
discussed only particular information on scientific testing. Thus, the Court concluded that the
lower court properly allowed Montgomery to testify.
Jury instructions regarding spoliation of evidence
Next, the Court considered whether Higgs’ should have received a spoliation jury
instruction. Citing Daniels v. State, the Court noted that the State’s failure to preserve material
evidence may support a spoliation instruction or dismissal, if the defendant can show bad faith or
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Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (replacing the “general acceptance in the
particular field” approach previously required by Frye v. United States).
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Id. at 588.
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Id. at 589.
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Such factors include whether the evidence has been tested, subjected to peer review and publication, has known
potential error rates, or if it is generally or widely accepted. Id. at 593-94.
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Hallmark v. Eldrige, 124 Nev. ___, ___, 189 P.3d 646, 650 (2008).

prejudice.10 Because Higgs did not allege bad faith and the State did not benefit from the alleged
poor preservation, the Court quickly rejected this point.
Accumulation of plain error
Finally, the Court considered eleven instances of plain error that Higgs alleged occurred
throughout the trial. Because defense counsel did not object to any of the errors when they
occurred, the Court noted that reversal is only available where a defendant’s substantial rights
are affected by actual prejudice or there is a miscarriage of justice.11 After reviewing the case,
the Court held that none of the alleged errors rose to the high standard.
Concurring/Dissenting Opinion
Justice Cherry concurred with the majority’s rejection of Daubert, but would have
reversed Higgs’ conviction. Justice Cherry reasoned that there was no earth-shattering reason to
proceed to trial without fully completing discovery. Although defense counsel did not
specifically claim the expediency caused prejudice, the defense expert’s failure to testify resulted
in sufficient harm because toxicology was critical to the State’s case. Furthermore, because
discovery is an important component of confrontation12 and relates to an individual’s capability
to effectively cross-examine, it was a violation of Higgs’ due process rights to deny a motion to
continue the trial.
Concurring/Dissenting Opinion
Justice Saitta also concurred with the majority’s rejection of Daubert and would have
reversed Higgs’ conviction for due process reasons. Opining that defense expert Walls needed
more time to evaluate the FBI toxicology report, Justice Saitta reasoned that the lower court
abused its discretion by failing to accommodate the defendant’s right to discovery.
Conclusion
The Court denied all of Higgs’ arguments on appeal and upheld the lower court’s
conviction. In order to resolve confusion about expert witness testimony the Court reaffirmed
that judges have much discretion in determining whether to admit an expert’s testimony.
Although the factors listed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Company may be persuasive authority,
state law encourages judges to use legal principles to assess cases on their own facts.
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